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Abstract	  One’s	   own	   emotional	   response	   towards	   a	   hypothetical	   action	   can	   influence	  judgments	   of	   its	   moral	   acceptability.	   Some	   individuals	   with	   Autism	   Spectrum	  Disorder	   (ASD)	   exhibit	   atypical	   emotional	   processing,	   and	   moral	   judgments.	  Research	   suggests,	   however,	   that	   emotional	   deficits	   in	   ASD	   are	   due	   to	   co-­‐occurring	  alexithymia,	  meaning	  atypical	  moral	  judgments	  in	  ASD	  may	  be	  due	  to	  alexithymia	   also.	   Individuals	   with	   and	  without	   ASD	   (matched	   for	   alexithymia)	  judged	  the	  moral	  acceptability	  of	  emotion-­‐evoking	  statements,	  and	  identified	  the	  emotion	  evoked.	  Moral	   acceptability	   judgments	  were	  predicted	  by	  alexithymia.	  Crucially,	  however,	  this	  relationship	  held	  only	  for	  individuals	  without	  ASD.	  While	  ASD	  diagnostic	   status	  did	  not	  directly	  predict	   either	   judgment,	   those	  with	  ASD	  did	   not	   base	   their	   moral	   acceptability	   judgments	   on	   emotional	   information.	  Findings	   are	   consistent	   with	   evidence	   demonstrating	   that	   decision-­‐making	   is	  less	  subject	  to	  emotional	  biases	  in	  those	  with	  ASD.	  	  
Lay	  Abstract	  This	   study	   suggests	   that	   typical	   people	   base	   their	   judgments	   of	   the	   moral	  acceptability	   of	   behavior	   on	   their	   emotional	   response	   to	   that	   behavior.	   People	  with	  autism	  spectrum	  disorder	  do	  not	   seem	  to	  use	  emotional	   information,	  and	  may	  rely	  more	  on	  rules	  to	  judge	  moral	  acceptability.	  	  	  Keywords:	  Alexithymia,	  morality,	  autism,	  emotion	  identification,	  empathy	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Moral	   reasoning	   plays	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   human	   societies,	   resting	   upon	   moral	  principles	  that	  prescribe	  how	  individuals	  ought	  to	  behave.	  Individual	  differences	  in	   moral	   ideology	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   different	   moral	   principles,	  however,	   with	   subsequent	   impact	   upon	   moral	   reasoning.	   For	   example,	  	  individuals	  may	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  moral	  acceptability	  of	  behavior	  that	  is	   undertaken	   (deontologists),	   or	   with	   the	   consequences	   of	   that	   behavior	  (utilitarians/consequentialists).	  Philosophers	  have	  debated	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  moral	  reasoning;	  while	  some	  argue	  that	  morality	  is	  a	  purely	  rational	  process,	  based	  upon	  deliberative	   reasoning	   (Cudworth,	  1996;	  Kant,	  1785/1965),	  others	  emphasize	   the	   role	   of	   emotions	   (Hume,	   1777/1960;	   Prinz,	   2004).	   It	   is	   now	  generally	   accepted	   that	   both	   emotional	   and	   rational	   processes	   contribute	   to	  moral	   decision-­‐making	   (Cushman,	   Young,	   &	   Greene,	   2010;	   Ugazio,	   Lamm,	   &	  Singer,	   2012).	   The	   dual-­‐process	   model	   of	   morality	   (Greene,	   Sommerville,	  Nystrom,	   Darley,	   &	   Cohen,	   2001;	   Greene,	   Nystrom,	   Engell,	   Darley,	   &	   Cohen,	  2004)	   posits	   that	   individuals	   attend	   to	   their	   own	   emotional	   response	   towards	  engaging	   in	   different	   behaviors,	   as	   well	   as	   deliberating	   upon	   the	   outcomes	   of	  these	  behaviors,	  to	  judge	  their	  moral	  acceptability.	  	  Consistent	   with	   emotions	   being	   involved	   in	   moral	   decision-­‐making,	   automatic	  emotional	   reactions	   to	   victims’	   emotional	   states	   influence	   moral	   judgments	  (Haidt,	  2001),	  and	  lead	  to	  condemnation	  of	  moral	  violations	  (Decety	  &	  Cacioppo,	  2012;	  Pizarro,	  2000).	  Aversive	  emotional	   reactions	   to	   such	  behaviors	   lead	   to	  a	  judgment	   that	   any	   deliberate	   action	   causing	   distress	   is	   immoral	   (Avramova	   &	  Inbar,	  2013;	  Haidt,	  2001).	  Thus,	  emotional	  responses	  to	  immoral	  behavior	  may	  arise	   through	   two	  routes;	  direct	  emotional	   response	   to	   the	  behavior	   itself,	   and	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empathic	   reaction	   to	   the	   distress	   the	   behavior	   elicits	   in	   its	   victim	   (Miller	   &	  Cushman,	  2013;	  Pizarro,	  2000).	  Neurological	  evidence	  also	  suggests	   that	  moral	  reasoning	  recruits	  brain	  regions	  involved	  in	  empathy	  and	  emotion	  recognition	  in	  oneself	   and	   others	   (Bzdok	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Greene,	   2003;	   Moll	   et	   al.,	   2002).	  Conditions	  associated	  with	  impaired	  recognition	  of	  one’s	  own	  emotions	  may	  also	  be	   associated	  with	   atypical	  moral	   acceptability	   judgments,	   therefore.	   Crucially,	  the	   degree	   to	  which	   impaired	   recognition	   of	   one’s	   own	   emotion	   affects	  moral	  reasoning	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  relies	  on	  emotional	  versus	  deliberative	  reasoning	  when	  making	  moral	  judgments.	  	  	  	  Alexithymia	   is	   a	   sub-­‐clinical	   trait	   associated	   with	   difficulties	   identifying	   and	  describing	   one’s	   own	   emotions	   (Nemiah,	   Freyberger,	   &	   Sifneos,	   1976).	  Consistent	  with	  a	  role	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  one’s	  own	  emotion	  during	  moral	  reasoning,	   increased	   alexithymia	   is	   associated	   with	   more	   utilitarian	   decision-­‐making	   (Patil	   &	   Silani,	   2014b),	   and	   increased	   perceived	   permissibility	   of	  accidentally	   harming	   others	   (Patil	   &	   Silani,	   2014a).	   Decreased	   ability	   to	  recognize	  emotions	  in	  oneself	  therefore	  affects	  moral	  decisions,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  dual-­‐process	  theory	  of	  morality	  (Greene	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Greene	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  	  It	   is	   widely	   reported	   that	   individuals	   with	   Autism	   Spectrum	   Disorder	   (ASD)	  exhibit	  difficulties	  recognizing	  their	  own	  emotions	  (Hill,	  Berthoz,	  &	  Frith,	  2004;	  Rieffe,	  Meerum	  Terwogt,	  &	  Kotronopoulou,	  2007),	  and	  empathizing	  with	  others	  (e.g.	   Baron-­‐Cohen	   &	   Wheelwright,	   2004),	   suggesting	   moral	   reasoning	  impairments	   should	   also	   be	   a	   feature	   of	   ASD.	   Evidence	   for	   atypical	   moral	  judgments	   in	   ASD	   populations	   is	   mixed,	   however	   (Gleichgerrcht	   et	   al.,	   2013;	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Moran	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Li,	   Zhu,	   &	   Gummerum,	   2014;	   Schneider	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Zalla,	  Barlassina,	   Buon,	   &	   Leboyer,	   2011).	   Co-­‐occurring	   alexithymia	   in	   ASD	   may	  explain	  this	  inconsistency.	  	  Alexithymia	   characterizes	   under	   10%	   of	   the	   typical	   population,	   but	  approximately	   50%	   of	   the	   ASD	   population	   (Berthoz	   &	   Hill,	   2005;	   Hill	   et	   al.,	  2004).	   Alexithymia	   and	   ASD	   are	   distinct,	   however;	   alexithymia	   is	   neither	  necessary	   nor	   sufficient	   for	   an	   ASD	   diagnosis,	   nor	   is	   it	   universal	   among	  individuals	  with	  ASD.	  Similarly,	  co-­‐occurring	  alexithymia	   is	  not	  specific	   to	  ASD;	  numerous	   clinical	   populations	   (e.g.	   eating	   disorders,	   panic	   disorder	   and	  substance	  abuse	  (Grynberg	  et	  al.,	  2012))	  also	  co-­‐occur	  with	  alexithymia.	  Recent	  research	   demonstrates	   that,	   where	   observed,	   empathy	   deficits	   and	   emotion	  recognition	   impairments	   in	  ASD	  are	  explained	  by	  co-­‐occurring	  alexithymia,	  not	  ASD	  per	   se	   (Bird	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Cook,	   Brewer,	   Shah,	   &	   Bird,	   2013;	  Heaton	   et	   al.,	  2012;	   Bird	   &	   Cook,	   2013).	   Given	   these	   findings,	   and	   the	   contribution	   of	  emotional	   identification	  and	  empathy	  to	  moral	  reasoning,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  the	  atypical	  moral	  reasoning	  observed	  in	  some	  individuals	  with	  ASD	  is	  a	  product	  of	  alexithymia,	   and	   unrelated	   to	   ASD	   itself.	   The	   current	   study	   tested	   this	  hypothesis,	   investigating	   the	   separate	   contribution	   of	   alexithymia	   and	   ASD	  symptom	  severity	  to	  moral	  judgments.	  	  	  
Method	  
Participants	  25	  individuals	  (6	  female)	  with,	  and	  22	  individuals	  (5	  female)	  without	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  ASD	  participated	  in	  this	  study.	  24	  typical	  individuals	  initially	  participated,	  but	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two	   were	   removed	   in	   order	   to	   match	   the	   groups	   according	   to	   alexithymia,	  measured	  by	  the	  Toronto	  Alexithymia	  Questionnaire	  (TAS-­‐20;	  Bagby,	  Parker,	  &	  Taylor,	  1994)	  [t(45)	  =	  1.56,	  p	  =	   .128,	  CI[14.32,	   -­‐1.88]]	  (control	  M	  =	  50.14,	  SD	  =	  16.03;	  ASD	  M	  =	  56.36,	  SD	  =	  10.30).	  The	  TAS-­‐20	  has	  high	  reliability	  and	  validity	  (Parker,	  Taylor,	  &	  Bagby,	  2003)	  and	  includes	  items	  such	  as	  ‘I	  am	  often	  confused	  about	  what	  emotion	  I	  am	  feeling’	  and	  ‘It	  is	  difficult	  for	  me	  to	  find	  the	  right	  words	  for	  my	   feelings’,	   answered	   on	   a	   scale	   from	  1	   (does	   not	   describe	  me	  well)	   to	   5	  (describes	   me	   very	   well).	   The	   ASD	   and	   control	   groups	   were	   also	   matched	  according	   to	   age	   [t(45)	   =	   .885,	  p	   =	   .381,	  d	   =	   .53,	   CI[10.64,	   -­‐4.14]	   (control	  M	   =	  31.27,	  SD	  =	  12.16;	  ASD	  M	  =	  34.52,	  SD	  =	  12.88),	  gender	  [X2(1)	  =	  .01,	  p	  =	  .918],	  and	  IQ,	   measured	   using	   the	  Wechsler	   Abbreviated	   Scale	   of	   Intelligence	   (Wechsler,	  1999)	  [t(45)	  =	   .061,	  p	  =	   .951,	  CI[10.04,	  -­‐9.45]]	  (control	  M	  =	  106.86,	  SD	  =	  16.20;	  ASD	  M	  =	  107.16,	  SD	  =	  16.85).	  	  The	  Autism-­‐Spectrum	  Quotient	  (AQ;	  Baron-­‐Cohen,	  Wheelwright,	  Skinner,	  Martin,	  &	  Clubley,	  2001)	  assessed	  ASD	  symptom	  severity	   in	  all	  participants.	  AQ	  scores	  were	  significantly	  higher	  in	  the	  ASD	  (M	  =	  26.63,	  SD	  =	  11.68)	  than	  control	  group	  (M	   =	   18.85,	   SD	   =	   8.60)	   [t(45)	   =	   3.36,	   p	   =	   .002,	   CI[14.83,	   3.72]].	   Current	  functioning	   of	   all	   individuals	   in	   the	   ASD	   group	   was	   assessed	   with	   the	   Autism	  Diagnostic	   Observation	   Schedule	   (ADOS)	   Module	   4	   (Lord	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   ADOS	  scores	   meeting	   criteria	   for	   ASD	   may	   be	   categorized	   as	   indicative	   of	   either	  ‘autism’	  or	   ‘autism	  spectrum’.	  Of	  the	  25	  participants	  with	  a	  clinical	  diagnosis	  of	  ASD	  (assessed	  by	  independent	  clinicians,	  according	  to	  DSM-­‐IV	  criteria),	  21	  also	  met	  the	  ADOS	  criteria	  for	  ASD	  (13	  for	  autism,	  8	  for	  autism	  spectrum).	  Although	  four	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  ASD	  group	  did	  not	  meet	  criteria	  for	  ASD	  according	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to	   the	   ADOS,	   they	   received	   diagnoses	   from	   independent	   clinicians	   and	   scored	  above	   cut-­‐off	   for	   autism	   on	   the	   AQ.	   These	   individuals	   were	   included	   in	   the	  reported	  analyses,	  but	  were	  not	  outliers	  on	  any	  analysis,	  and	  their	  exclusion	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  pattern	  of	  results.	  	  
Procedure	  A	   previously-­‐validated	   task	   assessed	   moral	   judgments	   (Marsh	   &	   Cardinale,	  2012).	  Participants	  viewed	  100	  emotive	   statements,	   equally	  divided	   into	   those	  evoking	  happiness,	  sadness,	  fear,	  disgust	  and	  anger.	  Statements	  include	  ‘I	  bought	  you	   a	   present’	   (happiness),	   ‘I	   don’t	   want	   to	   be	   friends	   any	  more’	   (sadness),	   ‘I	  could	  easily	  hurt	  you’	  (fear),	  ‘I	  never	  wash	  my	  hands’	  (disgust),	  and	  ‘I	  broke	  your	  phone	   on	   purpose’	   (anger).	   Each	   statement	   was	   presented	   once,	   with	   order	  randomized	   across	   participants.	   Participants	   were	   required	   to	   rate	   the	   moral	  acceptability	   of	   saying	   each	   statement	   to	   another	   person,	   where	   1	   =	   never	  acceptable,	   2	   =	   rarely	   acceptable,	   3	   =	   usually	   acceptable,	   and	   4	   =	   always	  acceptable.	   Ability	   to	   identify	   the	   evoked	   emotion	  was	   assessed	   by	   presenting	  the	   same	   statements	   in	   a	   random	  order,	   and	   requiring	   participants	   to	   identify	  their	   own	   emotional	   response	   to	   each	   statement,	   from	   happiness,	   sadness,	  disgust,	  anger	  and	  fear.	  	  	  Five	  moral	  acceptability	  scores	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  by	  taking	  the	  mean	  rating	  for	  each	  of	  the	  emotion-­‐inducing	  categories.	  A	  Global	  Morality	  score,	  where	   higher	   scores	   indicate	   more	   severe	   difficulties	   in	   judging	   moral	  acceptability,	  was	   calculated	  by	   taking	   the	  mean	  moral	   acceptability	   scores	   for	  the	  five	  statement	  types,	  with	  happiness	  acceptability	  ratings	  reverse-­‐scored.	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  When	  assessing	  identification	  of	  emotion,	  scores	  were	  assessed	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  typical	  validation	  sample	  reported	  in	  Marsh	  and	  Cardinale	  (2012).	  An	  ‘error’	  score	   indexed	   the	   frequency	   with	   which	   participants	   selected	   an	   atypical	  emotion,	  whereby	  increasing	  values	  indicate	  less	  typical	  performance,	  using	  the	  following	  equation.	  	  	  
Error	  Score	  =	  Σ(Number	  of	  Correct	  Responses	  –	  Perfect	  Performance)2	  	  	  Perfect	   performance	   was	   20	   responses	   of	   the	   statement	   emotion,	   and	   zero	  responses	  of	  all	  other	  emotions.	  
	  
Data	  analysis	  
T-­‐tests	   determined	   whether	   the	   ASD	   and	   alexithymia-­‐matched	   control	   groups	  differed	   in	   Global	   Morality	   score.	   Correlation	   analyses	   determined	   the	  relationship	   between	   ASD	   symptom	   severity,	   alexithymia,	   and	   moral	  acceptability	   judgments,	   in	   the	   full	   sample,	   and	   the	   ASD	   and	   control	   groups	  separately.	  Fisher’s	  r-­‐to-­‐z	  transformations	  compared	  the	  correlation	  coefficients	  in	  the	  two	  groups.	  	  Hierarchical	  regression	  analyses	  (conducted	  separately	  in	  the	  control	   and	   ASD	   groups)	   determined	   whether	   alexithymia	   or	   ASD	   symptom	  severity	  predicted	  moral	  acceptability	   judgments	  once	  age,	   gender,	  depression,	  and	  anxiety	  were	  controlled	  for,	  and	  whether	  each	  could	  predict	  the	  dependent	  variables	   after	   the	   other	   was	   controlled	   for.	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   perform	  hierarchical	  regressions	  with	  alexithymia	  and	  ASD	  symptom	  severity	  entered	  in	  both	   possible	   orders	   to	   independently	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	   each,	   after	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controlling	  for	  the	  other,	  due	  to	  colinearity.	  Analyses	  that	  do,	  and	  do	  not,	  control	  for	  alexithymia	  when	  assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  ASD	  (and	  vice	  versa)	  allow	  for	  the	  potential	  overlap	  in	  measures	  of	  each	  construct	  to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  If	  the	  AQ	  (a	  putative	   measure	   of	   ASD	   symptom	   severity)	   also	   taps	   into	   some	   features	   of	  alexithymia,	  controlling	  for	  alexithymia	  when	  assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  ASD	  using	  the	   AQ	   will	   provide	   a	   more	   ‘pure’	   measure	   of	   ASD	   traits,	   unconfounded	   by	  alexithymia.	   If	   alexithymia	   is	   a	   feature	  of	  ASD	   (which	  we	   suggest	   is	   incorrect),	  however,	  then	  the	  above	  analyses	  utilizing	  raw	  AQ	  scores	  without	  controlling	  for	  alexithymia	   would	   be	   judged	   to	   be	   more	   appropriate.	   A	   regression	   analysis	  determined	   whether	   ASD	   group	   moderated	   the	   relationship	   between	  alexithymia	   and	   moral	   judgments.	   Finally,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   emotional	  identification	  predicted	  moral	  acceptability	   judgments	  was	   investigated	  in	  each	  group	  using	  correlation	  analyses.	  
	  
Results	  The	  ASD	  (M	  =	  1.79,	  SD	  =	  .45)	  and	  alexithymia-­‐matched	  control	  groups	  (M	  =	  1.92,	  
SD	  =	   .58)	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  Global	  Morality	  score	  [t(45)	  =	   .850,	  p	  =	   .400,	  CI[.17,	  -­‐.43]],	   or	   individual	   morality	   scores	   (Table	   1).	   Global	   Morality	   score	   was	  uncorrelated	  with	  ASD	  symptom	  severity,	  measured	  by	  AQ,	  (r	  =	   .220,	  p	  =	  .137),	  but	  was	  significantly	  related	  to	  alexithymia	  (r	  =	  .391,	  p	  =	  .007).	  No	  morality	  score	  for	   the	   individual	   emotional	   categories	   correlated	   significantly	   with	   ASD	  symptom	  severity,	  while	  alexithymia	  significantly	  predicted	  morality	  judgments	  of	  statements	  eliciting	  happiness	  (r	  =	  -­‐.377,	  p	  =	  .009),	  fear	  (r	  =	  .390,	  p	  =	  .007)	  and	  anger	   (r	   =	   .390,	  p	   =	   .007).	  Correlations	  between	  moral	  acceptability	   judgments	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for	  the	  different	  statement	  types	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  2,	  for	  the	  full	  sample	  and	  the	  control	  and	  ASD	  groups	  separately.	  	  
Table	   1.	  Means,	   standard	   deviations	   and	   t-­‐test	   for	   group	   difference	   for	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments	  for	  the	  individual	  statement	  types.	  	  Statement	  type	   	   Control	  mean	  (SD)	   	   ASD	  mean	  (SD)	   	   t(40)	  	   	   p	  Happiness	   	   3.22	  (.89)	   	   3.50	  (.60)	   	   1.20	   	   .237	  Sadness	   	   2.34	  (.52)	   	   2.14	  (.65)	   	   .539	   	   .593	  Disgust	   	   2.02	  (.58)	   	   1.99	  (.72)	   	   .154	   	   .878	  Anger	   	   1.88	  (.71)	   	   1.80	  (.66)	   	   .345	   	   .732	  Fear	   	   1.85	  (.68)	   	   1.69	  (.41)	   	   .888	   	   .381	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	   2.	   Correlations	   between	   moral	   acceptability	   ratings	   for	   the	   different	  emotion	  categories.	  *	  p	  <	  .05,	  **	  p	  <	  .01,	  ***	  p	  <	  .001.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   determine	   whether	   the	   relationship	   between	   alexithymia	   and	   moral	  acceptability	   ratings	   varies	   across	   the	   ASD	   and	   control	   groups,	   correlational	  analyses	   were	   conducted	   in	   the	   groups	   separately.	   Alexithymia	   correlated	  significantly	  with	  Global	  Morality	  score	  in	  the	  control	  sample	  (r	  =	  .716,	  p	  <	  .001),	  but	   not	   the	   ASD	   sample	   (r	   =	   -­‐.053,	   p	   =	   .802).	   A	   Fisher	   r-­‐to-­‐z	   transformation	  indicated	   that	   the	   two	   correlations	   differed	   significantly	   from	   each	   other	   (Z	   =	  
	   	   Happiness	   Sadness	   Fear	   Disgust	  Full	  Sample	   Sadness	   -­‐.085	   	   	   	  	   Fear	   -­‐.659***	   .527***	   	   	  	   Disgust	   -­‐.228	   .780***	   .603***	   	  	   Anger	   -­‐.528***	   .766***	   .797***	   .802***	  Control	   Sadness	   -­‐.299	   	   	   	  	   Fear	   -­‐.816***	   .615	  **	   	   	  	   Disgust	   -­‐.438*	   .705***	   .665***	   	  	   Anger	   -­‐.719***	   .779***	   .907***	   .787***	  ASD	   Sadness	   .172	   	   	   	  	   Fear	   -­‐.306	   .469*	   	   	  	   Disgust	   .026	   .826***	   .572**	   	  	   Anger	   -­‐.264	   .766***	   .674***	   .819***	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3.04,	   p	   =	   .002).	   Alexithymia	   was	   also	   significantly	   associated	   with	   moral	  acceptability	   judgments	   for	  all	   statement	   types	   in	   the	  control	  group	  (Figure	  1),	  but	  not	  with	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments	  for	  any	  of	  the	  emotion	  categories	  in	  the	  ASD	  group.	  	  
Figure	   1.	  Correlations	  between	  alexithymia	  and	  moral	  acceptability	   judgments	  for	   anger,	   disgust,	   fear,	   happiness	   and	   sadness-­‐inducing	   statements	   in	   the	  control	  group. 	  Hierarchical	   regression	   analyses	   were	   conducted	   separately	   in	   the	   ASD	   and	  control	   groups.	   In	   the	   control	   group,	   alexithymia	   significantly	   predicted	  Global	  Morality	   judgments	   over	   and	   above	   age,	   gender,	   depression	   and	   anxiety,	  regardless	  of	  the	  order	  alexithymia	  and	  ASD	  symptom	  severity	  were	  entered	  into	  
	   12	  
the	  regression	  model	  (Table	  3),	  while	  ASD	  symptom	  severity	  did	  not	  significantly	  predict	  Global	  Morality	  when	  alexithymia	  was	  also	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  In	  the	  ASD	   group,	   neither	   alexithymia	   nor	   ASD	   symptom	   severity	   predicted	   Global	  Morality.	  	  Linear	   regression,	  with	   the	   independent	   variables	   alexithymia,	  ASD	  group,	   and	  their	   interaction	   term	   (alexithymia	   x	   ASD	   group),	   determined	   whether	   ASD	  group	  moderated	  the	  relationship	  between	  alexithymia	  and	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments.	   Although	   alexithymia	   was	   (β	   =	   .311,	   t	   =	   2.237,	   p	   =	   .031)	   and	   ASD	  group	  was	  not	   (β	   =	   -­‐.203,	   t	   =	   -­‐1.565,	  p	   =	   .125)	  a	   significant	  predictor	  of	   global	  morality	   score,	   the	   interaction	   term	  significantly	  predicted	  morality	   judgments	  (β	   =	   -­‐.361,	   t	   =	   -­‐2.673,	   p	   =	   .011).	   ASD	   group	   therefore	  moderated	   the	   effect	   of	  alexithymia	  on	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments.	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b   Control Global Morality Score  ASD Global Morality Score 
Step Predictor  Β p R2 ΔR2 
(p) 
β p R2 ΔR2 
(p) 




 .086 .658  
43.3% 
 
43.3% Gender  -.242 .305  .155 .558 
 Depression  .333 .327    -.325 .299  (.018) 
 Anxiety  .145 .687    -.421 .081   










Gender  -.245 .256  .076 .775 
Depression  .129 .687  -.292 .340 
Anxiety  -.001 .997  -.450 .059 
ASD severity  .514 .050  .244 .173 













Gender  -.107 .551  .093 .740 
Depression  .075 .775  -.296 .347 
Anxiety  -.407 .195  -.448 .068 
ASD severity  .101 .678  .257 .183 
Alexithymia  .875 .008  -.047 .815 
a   Control Global Morality Score  ASD Global Morality Score 
Step Predictor  Β p R2 ΔR2 
(p) 
β p R2 ΔR2 
(p) 




 .086 .658  
 43.3% 
 
43.3% Gender  -.242 .305  .155 .558 
 Depression  .333 .327  (.172)  -.325 .299  (.018) 
 Anxiety  .145 .687    -.421 .081   










Gender  -.095 .579  .137 .634 
Depression  .097 .695  -.321 .319 
Anxiety  -.419 .168  -.424 .088 
Alexithymia  .943 .001  .039 .841 













Gender  -.107 .551  .093 .740 
Depression  .075 .775  -.296 .347 
Anxiety  -.407 .195  -.448 .068 
Alexithymia  .875 .008  -.047 .815 
ASD severity  .101 .678  .257 .183 
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Discussion	  It	  is	  widely	  suggested	  that	  both	  deliberative	  reasoning	  and	  emotional	  responses	  contribute	   to	   judgments	   concerning	   the	   moral	   acceptability	   of	   behavior.	   If	  emotions	  shape	  moral	  judgments,	  impairments	  identifying	  one’s	  own	  emotional	  responses,	   such	   as	   in	   alexithymia,	   may	   cause	   atypical	   moral	   acceptability	  judgments	   (Patil	   &	   Silani,	   2014a,	   2014b),	   with	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   emotion	  identification	   impacts	   upon	   moral	   reasoning,	   dependant	   upon	   the	   relative	  influence	   of	   deliberative	   reasoning	   and	   emotional	   processes.	   We	   tested	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   alexithymia,	   rather	   than	   ASD	   per	   se,	   is	   related	   to	   moral	  judgments	   through	   its	   impact	  upon	  emotion	   identification.	  The	  hypothesis	  was	  partly	   supported;	  while	  ASD	  did	  not	   affect	   judgments	   of	  moral	   acceptability,	   it	  moderated	  the	  relationship	  between	  alexithymia	  and	  these	  judgments.	  	  	  In	   typical	   individuals,	   alexithymia	   was	   associated	   with	   atypical	   moral	  acceptability	  judgments.	  Individuals	  with	  more	  severe	  alexithymia	  considered	  it	  less	   acceptable	   to	   induce	   happiness	   in	   others,	   and	   more	   acceptable	   to	   induce	  sadness,	  fear,	  disgust,	  and	  anger.	  In	  individuals	  with	  ASD,	  however,	  alexithymia	  did	  not	  predict	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments.	  This	  differential	  pattern	  of	  results	  suggests	   the	   reliance	   on	   two	   different	   strategies	   when	   making	   judgments	   of	  moral	   acceptability.	   This	   conclusion	  was	   supported	  by	   analyses	   comparing	   the	  identification	  of	  emotion	  with	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments;	  while	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  emotion	   identification	  was	  (a)typical	  correlated	  with	  moral	  acceptability	  judgments	   in	   those	   without	   ASD,	   these	   were	   uncorrelated	   in	   individuals	   with	  ASD.	  While	  typical	  individuals	  judged	  the	  moral	  acceptability	  of	  emotion-­‐evoking	  statements	   based	   on	   the	   emotion	   likely	   to	   be	   evoked,	   and	   alexithymia,	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characterized	   by	   reduced	   emotion	   identification,	   negatively	   impacted	   on	   this	  process,	  those	  with	  ASD	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  emotion	  judgments	  when	  judging	  moral	  acceptability.	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  dual	  process	  model	  of	  morality,	  results	  indicated	  that	  individuals	  with	   ASD	   base	   their	   moral	   judgments	   on	   factors	   other	   than	   their	   emotional	  responses.	  Decreased	  reliance	  on	  emotion	   in	   those	  with	  ASD	   is	  consistent	  with	  previous	   reports	   of	   reduced	   emotional	   biases	   during	   decision-­‐making	   in	   this	  population	   (Damiano,	   Aloi,	   Treadway,	   Bodfish,	   &	   Dichter,	   2012;	   De	   Martino,	  Harrison,	  Knafo,	  Bird,	  &	  Dolan,	  2008).	  These	  findings	  have	  been	  explained	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  ‘two-­‐systems’	  model	  of	  human	  judgment	  (Evans,	  2003),	  in	  which	  both	   intuitive	  and	  analytic	  processes	   interact.	  Crucially,	   the	   intuitive	  process	   is	  subject	   to	   contextual	   emotional	   information	   (Kahneman,	  2003).	  Previous	  work	  has	   identified	   a	   role	   for	   the	   amygdala	   in	   such	   emotionally-­‐biased	   decision-­‐making	  (Benedetto	  De	  Martino,	  Kumaran,	  Seymour,	  &	  Dolan,	  2006;	  Kahneman	  &	  Frederick,	   2007),	   suggesting	   that	   decision-­‐making	   in	   ASD	   is	   less	   subject	   to	  emotional	  information	  due	  to	  reduced	  activation	  or	  connectivity	  of	  the	  amygdala	  (De	  Martino	  et	   al.,	   2008).	  Within	   the	   context	  of	  moral	   acceptability	   judgments,	  individuals	   with	   ASD	   may	   rely	   on	   learnt	   social	   norms	   rather	   than	   emotional	  information,	   in	   line	   with	   evidence	   that	   they	   rely	   more	   on	   rule-­‐based	   than	  emotional	  rationales	  when	  evaluating	  their	  own	  hypothetical	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  (Jameel,	   Vyas,	   Bellesi,	   Cassell,	   &	   Channon,	   2015).	   Alternatively,	   variance	   in	  understanding	   of	   causal	   relationships	   may	   predict	   moral	   judgments	   in	   ASD;	  reduced	   understanding	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   one’s	   actions	   may	   cause	   some	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behaviors	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   morally	   acceptable	   until	   negative	   effects	   are	  observed.	  	  Regarding	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  direct	  effect	  of	  ASD	  in	  moral	  reasoning,	  the	  current	  task	  makes	   limited	   demands	   on	  Theory	   of	  Mind	   (ToM;	   representing	   others’	  mental	  states).	  Moral	  reasoning	  may	  require	  ToM	  when	  a	  victim	  is	  harmed	  mentally	  but	  not	  physically,	  or	  an	  agent’s	  intention	  	  (e.g.	  to	  help)	  does	  not	  match	  the	  outcome	  of	   their	   behavior	   (harming	   another)	   (Moran	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   ToM	   deficits	   in	   ASD	  (Happé,	   1994)	   may	   cause	   atypical	   moral	   judgments	   in	   such	   situations,	  particularly	  in	  individuals	  with	  more	  severe	  ToM	  impairments.	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   although	   alexithymia	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   diagnostic	  criterion	   for	   ASD,	   diagnostic	   instruments	   often	   include	   limited	   measures	   of	  emotional	   competence.	   This	   makes	   it	   crucial	   to	   control	   for	   alexithymia	   when	  assessing	   the	   impact	   of	   ASD,	   and	   for	   ASD	   when	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	  alexithymia.	   The	   current	   study	   measured	   ASD	   symptom	   severity	   in	   all	  participants	  using	  the	  AQ.	  Although	  AQ	  correlates	  highly	  with	  other	  measures	  of	  ASD	   severity	   (e.g.	   ADOS	   (Brugha	   et	   al.,	   2012)),	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   correlations	  with	   ASD	   symptom	   severity	   may	   vary	   with	   measurement	   instrument.	   Finally,	  although	  we	  screened	   for	  ASD	   traits	   in	   the	   typical	   sample	  using	   the	  AQ,	   future	  studies	  should	  confirm	  the	  absence	  of	  ASD	  using	  the	  ADOS	  in	  the	  typical	  group.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  these	  findings	  add	  to	  existing	  literature	  on	  alexithymia	  and	  moral	  reasoning	   in	  non-­‐clinical	  populations	   (Patil	  &	  Silani,	  2014a,	  2014b),	   suggesting	  that	  difficulties	  in	  emotional	  identification,	  and	  possibly	  empathy,	  not	  only	  alter	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responses	   to	   others’	   emotions,	   but	   also	   the	   emotions	   one	   elicits	   in	   others;	  increased	   alexithymia	   may	   increase	   the	   tendency	   to	   cause	   distress	   to	   others	  during	   social	   interactions.	   Moral	   behavior	   is	   crucial	   for	   developing	   and	  maintaining	  social	  relationships,	  meaning	  atypical	  moral	   judgments	  may	  add	  to	  the	   social	   difficulties	   experienced	   by	   individuals	   with	   alexithymia.	   The	  differential	   results	   in	   typical	   and	   ASD	   individuals	   suggest	   the	   relationship	  between	  alexithymia	  and	  morality	  is	  complex,	  however.	  As	  alexithymia	  co-­‐occurs	  with	   several	   clinical	   conditions	   (Grynberg	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  investigate	  this	  relationship	  across	  multiple	  	  populations.	  If	  alexithymia	  predicts	  moral	   judgments	   in	   disorders,	   screening	   for	   alexithymia	   may	   contribute	   to	  decreasing	   the	  proportion	  of	   individuals	  with	  mental	  health	   issues	  currently	   in	  the	   criminal	   justice	   system.	   Systematic	   examination	   of	   the	   role	   of	   alexithymia	  across	   a	   number	   of	   clinical	   conditions	   is	   therefore	   warranted	   to	   fully	  characterize	  moral	  reasoning	  in	  individuals	  with	  psychiatric	  conditions.	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